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One of the most significant, recent contributions to the study of attention is the feature integration theory proposed by Treisman and her associates (Treisman, 1985; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Paterson, 1984; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982; Treisman & Souther, 1985) . The theory holds that the perception of objects is mediated by two distinct stages. In the first, features of objects register preattentively in independent, specialized maps. In the second stage, attention directed to the locations of objects serves to "glue" corresponding features into unified objects. This theory has attracted considerable interest and has generated a large body of research (e.g., Briand & Klein, 1987; Egeth, Virzi, & Garbart, 1984; Farrell, 1984; Houck & Hoffman, 1986; Nissen, 1985; Prinzmetal, 1981; Prinzmetal & Millis-Wright, 1984; Prinzmetal, Presti, & Posner, 1986) . Some of the work has been confirmatory, some has been critical, and some has suggested constraints on the theory.
The phenomenon of illusory conjunctions (e.g., Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) is generally taken as the primary support for the feature integration theory because unlike other findings (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980) , it involves a direct manipulation of attention (e.g., Briand & Klein, 1987; Prinzmetal et al., 1986 ). This finding demonstrates that when attention is diverted from a display of several figures, subjects wrongly combine features (e.g., color and shape) of the unrelated figures, which gives rise to perceived illusory conjunctions. The phenomenon is largely reduced when attention is focused on the display. On the surface this phenomenon seems to support the feature integration theory as it suggests that preattentively the features are free-floating and that they can be integrated only with the aid of focal attention.
In this article I first discuss conceptual problems of the feature integration theory and then critically review the study I am grateful to Robert Lubow, William Prinzmetal, and Anne Treisman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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of Treisman and Schmidt (1982) that first established the phenomenon as well as studies by Prinzmetal et al. (1986) and Briand and Klein (1987) . The latter studies, although partly critical of Treisman's work, also found that illusory conjunctions are influenced by manipulations of attention and thus seem to provide partial support for the feature integration theory. My article attempts to show both on empirical and theoretical grounds that the findings do not support the feature integration theory. This discussion does not dispute the phenomenon of illusory conjunctions nor does it argue against the notion that the representation of objects is preceded by independent feature registration. It rather argues against the basic tenet of the theory that identifies feature perception and object perception with corresponding stages of preattention and focal attention.
How Strong Is the Glue Linking
Findings to Theory?
The prevalent distinction between preattentive and attentive stages of processing has been extremely useful in the study of visual perception, yet this distinction can be misleading when it enforces a.strict dichotomous framework on newly investigated phenomena because some processes that benefit from attention can also be performed preattentively. Consider for example the detection of simple bright stimuli on a dark background. Posner, Snyder, and Davidson (1980) found that the detection of light increments is significantly improved when attention is oriented to the appropriate location by a central cue. This finding, of course, does not indicate that the detection of these stimuli cannot be performed preattentively, only that such detection is enhanced by attention. It has also been shown (e.g., Jonides, 1981) that when similarly simple stimuli are used as peripheral cues, they automatically attract attention to their location so as to improve the processing of a subsequently presented nearby stimulus. To serve as effective peripheral cues, these stimuli must obviously be detected when attention is focused elsewhere. Thus, the detection of these simple stimuli is facilitated by attention but can also be carried out without (or with minimal) attention, and different experimental manipulations reveal these different attentional aspects.
There seems to be an incongruence between the manipulations required to test the feature integration theory and the ones actually used in the three studies reviewed in this article. The theory claims that feature perception can be performed preattentively whereas feature integration cannot be performed without attention. The studies discussed below compared feature perception and feature integration with and without attention. As such, they address the question of whether attention can facilitate feature perception and integration, and they are totally mute on the question of whether these operations can be carried out preattentively. To address the latter issue, one needs to look at whether feature perception and integration can be performed at all without attention. The results of Treisman and Schmidt (1982) and Prinzmetal et at. (1986) indicate that a substantial number of the unattended features were correctly perceived and also correctly conjoined. There are two interpretations for this finding. First, it is possible that both feature perception and feature integration can be performed preattentively (although they may be facilitated by attention). This notion is strongly supported by the results of Houck and Hoffman (1986) , who have clearly shown that the integration of color and orientation can be performed without attention.
Second, it is possible that items designated as unattended may not actually be fully unattended. The distribution of spatial attention may not totally exclude noncued items, or subjects may direct attention to noncued items on some trials in spite of instructions. This unintended allocation of attention may be responsible for correct feature perception and integration of supposedly unattended times. Even if the latter interpretation is true, it clearly does not support the notion that feature integration cannot be carried out preattentively. At the most it can suggest that the illusory conjunctions paradigm is not suitable for investigating the question of whether these perceptual operations can be performed preattentively.
Treisman's attempt to apply the preattentive-attentive dichotomy to feature perception and integration may have been influenced by the fact that f~ature perception must precede feature integration. But suppose one disregards the sequence and considers these simply as two different perceptual operations. The fact that illusory conjunctions (which result from either misperception or incorrect integration of features) are affected to a greater extent by attention than feature errors may simply suggest that attention can facilitate feature integration in addition to its possible effects on feature perception. This reduces the gluing function into a simple attentional facilitation that is not uniquely different from the effects of attention on a variety of other perceptual processes. It is not attention that glues features into objects. Attentional resources may facilitate a process (e.g., localization of features) that is partl!¢ responsible for the integration of features into objects.
Thus, to strengthen the link between the theory and supportive findings, it is necessary to explicate the metaphorical gluing operation in terms of the processes that might be facilitated by attention. How does attention glue features into objects? Three possibilities are considered.
First, it is possible that features are both perceived and localized preattentively, but their integration requires focal attention. This may be close to what Treisman had in mind (Treisman & Souther, 1985) . This notion assumes that the representation of objects is mediated by the integration of features on the basis of their matched locations. For example, if the particular color and shape of a given object are represented in different topographical maps preserving their locations, all that is needed to integrate them is for the system to recognize that they activate corresponding locations. However, it is not clear why outwardly directed attention is needed for this essentially nonperceptual inference. The attentional "spotlight" performs an operation (e.g., increasing the visibility of stimuli appearing within the "illuminated" area) that is clearly stimulus dependent. Thus, attention directed at an object can facilitate the perception and localization of its features, but after the features of a given object have been registered and localized, any further gluing is a stimulus-free operation of calculating the correspondence between locations, and to see the display better will not help with this operation. Hence, this is a weak theoretical possibility as this gluing operation is not inherently related to the functions of focal attention.
A second possibility is that as attention scans visual locations, all those features appearing within the attention fixation (i,e., where the features are simultaneously perceived better than other features in the field) are integrated into perceived objects. This is a much stronger theoretical alternative. First, it is deafly derived from the functions of focal attention in specifying that features within the spotlight are perceived better than those outside it. Second, it explicates a reasonable mechanism of singling out clearly visible features from less visible ones. For example, it is possible to conceive of a mechanism instructing the system to perceive a red square whenever at the same time both red is more salient than other colors and square is more salient than other shapes in the field. However, this theory requires that the size of the spotlight ought to match the size of the object. That is, if more than one object is illuminated by a single attention fixation, illusory conjunctions ought to occur among features of attended objects that are "illuminated" simultaneously. However, it is difficult to conceive of a spotlight that can flexibly assume the precise size of an object, and moreover, it is not clear what may instruct attention to assume a given size before the object has been perceived. Furthermore, Prinzmetal et al. (1986) showed that attention allocated to several items of a display (rather than a single item) significantly reduces the level of illusory conjunctions. Thus, the theory is inconsistent with the evidence, because feature integration is facilitated even if attention is not allocated to individual objects in the field.
The third possibility is that attention may simply facilitate the perception of location. Because localization of features may be a prerequisite for their correct integration, it follows that attention reduces the magnitude of illusory conjunctions. A relevant finding was presented by Butler (1980) who showed that attention instructions affect mislocation errors but have little or no effect on intrusions. This finding suggests that attention facilitates localization to a greater extent than the perception of features. To provide more direct support for this theoretical possibility, this notion ought to be tested within an experimental paradigm that measures illusory conjunctions. For example, with such a paradigm the theory predicts that correctly conjoined features will also be correctly localized, whereas incorrectly conjoined features will largely be mislocalized. However, an examination of Treisman and Schmidt's (1982) first experiment (the only experiment that required a localization response) suggests that this prediction may not always hold. These data show that 15.5% of the correctly identified objects were mislocated (i.e., both features were mislocated) and that 15.4% of the illusory conjunctions entailed mislocations of both features. (In the majority of illusory conjunctions, only one feature was mislocated.) This finding is difficult to interpret. If localization were the major factor responsible for correct feature integration, one might possibly expect that the majority of illusory conjunctions entailed the mislocation of both features. For example, if the gluing of one feature to its location reflected the fact that this location was attended, it is not fully clear why the second feature remained free-floating.
This last finding provides only partial counterevidence to the third theoretical possibility. This possibility is the most straightforward one and perhaps the most easily testable. Further research focusing directly on the issue of localization may prove worthwhile and may show that the localization of features is one of several factors responsible for their integration. Although feature integration may be performed preattentively (Houck & Hoffman, 1986) , improved localization as a result of attention can further facilitate this perceptual operation. Treisman and Schmidt (1982) The first four experiments reported by Treisman and Schmidt (1982) indeed demonstrated illusory conjunctions among features of unrelated objects. Subjects were briefly presented with displays of several figures flanked by two digits. They were instructed to report first the peripheral digits (primary task) and then the central figures (secondary task). The results showed consistently that the number of illusory conjunctions among features of different figures reliably exceeded the number of corresponding feature errors. The latter number served as an estimate of illusory conjunctions that were due to guessing; it involved reported figures with one correct and one incorrect feature? In the fifth and final experiment, Treisman and Schmidt attempted to show that illusory conjunctions disappear (i.e., are reduced to the level of corresponding feature errors) when attention is directed at the central figures. Thus, they eliminated the digits and instructed subjects to report the central figures. This final experiment ought to have been treated as the crucial one for the feature integration theory. Unfortunately, rather than varying attention in an otherwise identical experiment, the fifth experiment included additional significant variations, each of which potentially confounded the authors' interpretation.
First, in the fifth experiment exposure duration was largely reduced. The purpose was to equate the number of feature errors with those of the fourth experiment. This manipulation may have introduced a confounding variable. Suppose, for example, that reduced exposure duration significantly impairs feature perception but has a minimal effect on location perception. This manipulation may increase substantially the amount of feature errors. If the proportion of illusory conjunctions resulting from feature misperception and guessing is relatively small, then the total number of illusory conjunctions may not be largely affected by the reduced duration. That is, because reduced exposure duration may increase feature errors but not location errors, it cannot increase the number of true illusory conjunctions that involve correctly perceived but mislocated features. This in turn may greatly diminish the difference between the numbers of illusory conjunctions and feature errors, which is essentially the result obtained in Experiment 5.
Second, in the fifth experiment the location of the target item was precued (rather than postcued as in the fourth experiment). Although precuing location is an attentional manipulation, it may not have been the appropriate one in that context. Under postcuing conditions all items are equally processed until the cue is presented, which thus gives rise to illusory conjunctions among all features in the display. In precuing conditions attention can be directed to the location of the target prior to stimulus onset. This inhibits the processing of nontarget items, hence prevents the intrusion of their features, and consequently reduces their conjunctions with features of the cued item. Indeed, contrary to feature integration theory, recent data (Prinzmetal et al., 1986) suggested that without attention there may be a reduction in the perception of features of noncued items. Obviously, irrespective of the effect of attention, features need to be registered in order to serve as available candidates for substitutions. It therefore seems that the study effectively compared illusory conjunctions for several unattended items with those for a single attended one.
Third, in all of the first four experiments, the report of the figures was delayed by first reporting the digits, whereas in the fifth experiment it was immediate. Hence, it is possible that illusory conjunctions did not reflect different levels of attention but rather the failure to retain combinations of features (previously represented as objects) in memory, which J Each display contained three of five possible letters in three of five possible colors. Reported illusory conjunctions could result from true illusory conjunctions entailing the correct perception of a shape and a color of two different letters in the display and their incorrect integration. Reported illusory conjunctions could also reflect guessing, for example, correctly perceiving a shape and guessing its color from one of five possible colors. If this color happened to be that of one of the other two letters in the display, this response was recorded as an illusory conjunction. Treisman and Schmidt (1982) reasoned that if illusory conjunctions were all based on guessing, then their number must equal the number of errors involving reporting objects with one correct feature and one feature that did not appear in the display. For example, having correctly perceived a letter shape but not its color, the subject ought to be equally likely to guess one of the two colors of the other letters in the display or one of the two colors not presented in the display. Therefore, the number of illusory conjunctions in excess of these errors reflected true illusory conjunctions.
gave rise to more illusory conjunctions, the greater the delay of the perceptual report.
More generally, I point out that this alternative explanation for the phenomenon will not be eliminated even if the figures are reported immediately as memorial processes obviously intervene between encoding and reporting the stimuli. Thus, it may always be the case that illusory conjunctions will not reflect an initial stage of independent feature registration but instead the failure of memory to hold together features previously represented as whole objects. Some evidence (Prinzmetal & Millis-Wright, 1984; Stefurak & Boynton, 1986) has provided indirect support for the memorial interpretation of illusory conjunctions in showing that this phenomenon is susceptible to influences of memorial processes. Furthermore, this interpretation seems quite logical because in addition to its influence on perceptual processes, attention is a crucial factor for preserving information in memory. Hence, when attention is diverted, perceived information may be lost prior to the completion of the task. This loss of information is selective, and information that carries less significant weight or is more difficult to retain is more likely to be lost. It may well be that in Treisman and Schmidt's study the identity of the features was far more significant to and much easier to comprehend by the processing system than were their meaningless combinations. In the absence of inherent relations among features of objects, it may be easier to retain, for example, the information square, triangle, blue, and red than the information a blue square and a red triangle. There are several reasons for this difference. For example, the latter information may demand greater retention effort because in addition to the features, it requires remembering their correct combinations. It may also require greater processing effort because the internal representations of concepts of individual features (e.g., red or square) are far more accessible than the ones that need to be formed for meaningless objects (e.g., a red square). Treisman and Schmidt (1982) considered and rejected the memorial interpretation of illusory conjunctions on the grounds that illusory conjunctions were obtained even when the verbal report task was replaced by a visual matching task. Nevertheless, whereas the matching task reduces the potential contribution of memorial processes, by no means does it necessarily eliminate such possible processing. In a later study Treisman (1985) applied signal detection theory to measure a pure perceptual effect (d') of attention on feature conjungfion relative to feature detection. She presented a circular array of objects that varied in shape, size, color, and solidity and defined a target either by a single feature (e.g., red) or by a conjunction of features (e.g., a large brown outline triangle). The display was preceded by one of three possible cues. A valid cue directed attention to the location of the target, a neutral cue did not provide any location information, and an invalid cue directed attention to a location the target did not occupy. The results indicated a substantially greater effect of attention (as measured by the difference between the effects of the various cues) on d' for conjunction targets relative to feature targets. However, there may have been a problem in this experiment. To match the performance for feature and conjunction targets, the displays for the latter were presented for a longer duration. It is quite possible that the longer duration effectively prolonged the time available to orient attention to the desired location beyond the interval between the cue and the target. This could easily predict stronger attention effects for the conjunction relative to the feature targets.
In conclusion, it seems that further studies with additional converging operations are required for deciding between the perceptual and memorial interpretations of illusory conjunctions.
Prinzmetal, Presti, and Posner (1986) Prinzmetal et al. (1986) presented displays that contained either an X (target) and three Os (distractors) or four Os. Two items were of one color, and two were of another. Subjects searched for prespecified targets (e.g., a pink X), and errors were compared for two display types. A yes response for a display that did not contain one of the target's features indicated feature misperception and was termed a feature false alarm (FA). A yes response for a display that contained the two targets' features but in different items (e.g., a pink O and a blue X for a pink X target) indicated either feature misperception or incorrect integration of correctly perceived features. This response was termed conjunction FA. To assess the effects of attention on feature perception and integration stimulus location, was either correctly (valid trials) or incorrectly (invalid trials) precued by peripheral arrows. The results showed a greater number of both feature FAs and conjunction FAs for invalid relative to valid trials. Prinzmetal et al. thus concluded that attention facilitates both feature perception and feature integration. The former was interpreted as inconsistent with the feature integration theory; the latter was taken as a partial support for the theory, although alternative theories were proposed as possibly accounting for the result.
One problem in this study is the inconsistent effects of attention on misses (failures to detect a target) and of FAs. This creates a problem in interpreting the results of only the first two experiments because the third experiment eliminated misses by using a forced-choice procedure. Prinzmetal et al. (1986) ignored the miss results contending that unlike FAs it is impossible to determine whether a given miss is due to a feature error (missing one or two features of the target) or to a conjunction error (conjoining a target shape with a distractor color). Nevertheless, irrespective of the relative contribution of these two types of errors to miss responses, to support Prinzmetal et al.'s conclusion, the total number of misses ought to have been greater for invalid than for valid trials, because both feature errors and conjunction errors were expected to be greater for unattended displays (as was observed for the FA data). The results suggest that the miss data ought not to have been ignored because miss rates were identical for valid and invalid trials: 15% versus 19% (Experiment l) and 26% versus 25% (Experiment 2), respectively. These results suggest either that one of the error types contributing to the total number of misses was more frequent for the valid trials or that both feature misses and conjunction misses were equal for the valid and invalid trials. The latter possibility is obviously more reasonable (and less damaging to the authors' interpretation). Furthermore, the extremely low rate of feature FAs indicates that subjects had little problem in perceiving the features, which thus suggests that misses were primarily due to illusory conjunctions. Hence, taken together the results curiously show that attention affected illusory conjunctions when the target was absent (FAs) but not when it was present (misses). By the logic of signal detection theory, the different number of illusory conjunctions for valid and invalid trials does not represent the capacity of attention to integrate features (sensitivity) but rather the greater tendency to respond yes (criterion shift) on invalid than on valid trials. This difference may be inherent in the cost-benefit paradigm. Invalid stimuli are not only less attended than valid ones; they are also more surprising, less expected, and far less frequent. All this may somehow lead to a greater uncertainty or lack of confidence. Given that subjects were given selective feedback on misses in order to bias them towards yes responses, this bias was more likely to influence uncertain trials and thus to produce a greater criterion shift for invalid than valid trials.
In their third experiment Prinzmetal et al. (1986) used a forced-choice procedure by presenting a target (either an X or an F) in each display. The results of this experiment were similar to the FA results of the first two experiments. Because, unlike Experiments 1 and 2, the third experiment's analyses were based on the entire set of results, it is not open to the criticism raised earlier. Note, however, that the problems with the first experiments weaken the interpretation of the third one. Prinzmetal et at. identified a potential problem in their third experiment, namely, the nearly perfect performance for feature perception. This ceiling effect may create a problem in comparing the relative effects of attention on feature errors and conjunction errors. The authors pointed out that because this logic cannot be applied to the second experiment (in which feature errors did not approach zero), the results taken in their entirety suggest that attention affects feature integration beyond its effect on feature perception. Thus, it seems that a more solid demonstration that attention affects feature integration requires the results of Experiment 2 as well as Experiment 3. Prinzmetal et al. (1986) focused on the effects of attention on feature registration and feature integration. Two other suggestive findings, not discussed by the authors, emerge from their data. The first concerns data limitations versus resource limitations. A crucial prediction for the feature integration theory is that illusory conjunctions ought not to increase when presentation conditions are impaired without manipulating attention (data limitations). Treisman and Schmidt (1982) addressed precisely this question by reducing exposure duration, but at the same time they also facilitated attention. Thus, it is impossible to evaluate the joint effect of greater attentional resources and shorter exposure duration. In their third experiment, Prinzmetal et al. attempted to reduce feature errors by using more saturated colors and spacing the letters farther apart (data manipulations). In addition to the effect on feature errors, these manipulations reduced illusory conjunctions from 43% in Experiment 2 to 15% in Experiment 3. The only other difference between the two experiments was that in Experiment 3 the target could be one of two possible letters (a difference that, if anything, could only make the task more difficult in Experiment 3). Although formal cross-experiment comparisons were not performed, this large reduction in the percentage of illusory conjunctions suggests, at least tentatively, that contrary to feature integration theory, illusory conjunctions were influenced by data limitations as well as by resource limitations.
The second suggestive finding is the far greater proportion of illusory conjunction than feature errors even for attended (valid) stimuli; 26% versus 4% (Experiment 1), 36% versus 11% (Experiment 2), and 12% versus 2% (Experiment3), respectively. Thus, contrary to feature integration theory, attention does not seem to eliminate illusory conjunctions. Admittedly, as Prinzmetal et al. (1986) pointed out, it is always the case than an unknown proportion of illusory conjunctions may result from feature errors. However, the massive difference between illusory conjunctions and feature errors, coupled with the fact that the proportion of feature errors in Experiment 3 was virtually zero, indicates that a substantial part of these illusory conjunctions were not contaminated by feature errors. The theory need not require that attention guarantees correct feature integration. However, average (across experiments) proportions of illusory conjunctions of 35% for unattended items and 25% for attended items are hardly consistent with the claim that attention is the sole factor responsible for feature integration. Both this small difference between illusory conjunctions for attended items and those for unattended ones, as well as the large proportion of illusory conjunction for attended items, at least suggest that in addition to attention there may be other factors that contribute to the correct integration of features under normal viewing conditions. It is possible that the large number of illusory conjunctions between attended features was due to the fact that the four times of the display were simultaneously attended. Treisman and Schmidt (1982) stated that they expected illusory conjunctions among features of several attended items. In their own study they reported that illusory conjunctions were eliminated when attention was directed at a single item. However, as was discussed earlier, there are alternative interpretations for this finding. Future studies may examine this issue more fully, perhaps by investigating the extent to which illusory conjunctions are formed between attended and unattended features. Briand and Klein (1987) Briand and Klein (1987) presented a pair of letters either from the set RPB (featured set) or from the set RPQ (conjunction set) and measured reaction times to decide whether an R was or was not one of the two presented letters. They reasoned that the conjunction set ought to be more difficult than the feature set because it might involve illusory conjunctions between features of the two presented letters. That is, when the PQ pair is presented, the diagonal line of Q may migrate to the letter P, thus resulting in the perception of an illusory R. Consequently, longer response latencies may be required to overcome an incorrect yes response. No illusory conjunctions of this type are possible when the letters PB of the feature set are presented. Briand and Klein argued that if attention facilitates feature integration, then manipulating attention ought to produce a stronger effect for the conjunction set that entails feature detection as well as feature integration than for the feature set that entails feature detection only.
In the first three experiments, attention was manipulated by using a central arrow that pointed to one of two possible locations that the letters were most likely to occupy. Clear attention effects were obtained in all experiments. That is, response latencies for valid trials in which the letters occupied the expected location were substantially shorter than those for invalid trials in which the letters appeared at the unexpected location. However, this effect did not interact with letter set; equal effects were obtained for the feature set and the conjunction set. In the fourth experiment Briand and Klein (1987) manipulated attention peripherally, similarly to Prinzmetal et al. (1986) , by representing two arrows near the location which the letters were most likely to occupy. In this experiment a stronger attention effect was obtained for the conjunction set than for the feature set. Briand and Klein therefore concluded that attention directed by a central cue does not play a role in feature integration, whereas attention directed by a peripheral cue does.
I argue later that this study does not provide any support for the feature integration theory because it suffers from difficulties that render the results difficult to interpret. Perhaps the most serious problem is Briand and Klein's assumption that longer latencies for identifying an R in the conjunction set than in the feature set were necessarily due to illusory conjunctions. These authors did recognize that the two sets also included featural differences, but they falsely assumed that these differences were completely assessed in a control experiment (Experiment l b). In this experiment the subjects were presented with a single letter, either an R or a Q in one condition and either an R or a B in another condition. Subjects were instructed to respond as fast as possible to the presence of an R. Shorter reaction times were obtained for the RQ set than for the RB set. Consequently, in the main experiments the authors decided that longer latencies involving the letter Q than those involving the letter B must be due to illusory conjunctions, because at the feature level Q is more distinguishable from R than is B.
This control experiment cannot however distinguish between feature errors and illusory conjunctions. Suppose that in all experiments subjects adopted a strategy whereby a single feature (or more features if necessary) that characterizes the R and not the remaining letters in the set was searched for. If it were found, the subjects would respond yes and if it were not found, they would respond no. In the control experiment, when presented with a single letter of the RB set, this distinguishing feature is the bottom diagonal line, and for the RQ set it is the vertical line. In the main experiments, when two letters from the feature set (RBP) were presented, the distinguishing feature (similarly to the corresponding condition in the control experiment) was still the bottom diagonal line. However, when two letters from the conjunction set (RQP) were presented, the distinguishing feature (unlike the corresponding condition in the control experiment) could no longer be the vertical line, because it characterizes both the R and the P. Here a correct response may necessitate the detection and integration of both the diagonal and the vertical lines. The implication of this analysis is clear: Longer latencies for the conjunction set than for the feature set need not reflect illusory conjunctions. The longer latencies may be due to the fact that the conjunction set required the detection of two features rather than one. Similarly, stronger attention effects for the conjunction set relative to the feature set, as obtained in Experiment 4, need not suggest that attention is required for feature integration as Briand and Klein (1987) proposed. Instead, this finding may show that the detection of two features required more attention than the detection of a single one. In summary, the RQP set required more attention than the RPB set either for the detection of an additional feature or for the integration of both features. Briand and Klein's design does not permit the separation of these two possible effects, and consequently, this result does not necessarily reflect the effect of attention on feature integration.
One could, in fact, empirically contrast Briand and Klein's (1987) interpretation with the alternative one proposed earlier by mixing the feature set and the conjunction set so that in any given trial two letters of the set RPBQ are presented and subjects are required to decide as fast as possible whether one of the two presented letters is an R. One could then compare latencies to no responses for the PB and PQ pairs. According to Briand and Klein's view, responses for the latter pair ought to be slower because it permits illusory conjunctions. My alternative interpretation predicts no difference between the two, because irrespective of the two letters actually presented, the inclusive set of possible letters dictates a strategy whereby two features always need to be identified before a decision. That is, because subjects do not know in advance which pair will be presented, they cannot adopt a "diagonal line strategy," even for the PB pair. Thus, unlike in the experiments discussed earlier, latencies for the PB pair will not be shorter than those for the PQ pair.
Fortunately, this proposed crucial experiment need not be carried out, because Briand and Klein (1987) themselves already conducted it (Experiment la). The results of this experiment confirm the prediction of my alternative interpretation and are incompatible with .Briand and Klein's own view. That is, Experiment la clearly showed no difference between no latencies for the pairs PB and PQ, when the feature set and the conjunction set were intermixed rather than blocked.
Apart from the difficulty in determining the cause for the different performances on the feature and conjunction sets, it is also not clear from the results of this study if peripheral cuing had a differential effect on responding to the RPQ set (that supposedly entailed illusory conjunctions) from that of central cuing. It may be instructive to examine the results of the fourth experiment in the context of the previous ones. The only difference between Experiments 3 and 4 is that the former used central cuing, whereas the latter used peripheral cuing. Thus, one can tentatively consider the two experiments as two conditions of a single experiment with cuing method as a between-subjects variable. Superimposing the figures of the two experiments (in which reaction times for the RPQ and RBP sets were plotted as functions of valid, neutral, and invalid cues) reveals a strange pattern of results: The PRQ functions are quite parallel, but the PRB function is substantially shallower in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 3. Thus, the entire pattern of results could be interpreted as suggesting that attention effects on the RPQ latencies were not affected by the method of cuing, whereas attention effects on the RPB latencies were greater for central cuing than for peripheral cuing. This is indeed a strange conclusion, but it is by no means less compelling than the one proposed by Briand and Klein (1987) .
The difficulty in interpreting these results suggests that it is unwarranted to compare the effects of central and peripheral cuing in this context. Briand and Klein (1987) attempted to ascribe different processing capacities (i.e., the gluing of features) to what may be the same attentional spotlight directed by a central or by a peripheral cue. It is also possible that the results reflect the different time course of automatically attracting attention (peripheral cuing) or consciously orienting attention (central cuing) that precedes the focusing of attention on the desired location.
Conclusions
The feature integration theory has provided a substantial contribution to the study of visual attention. It has produced important empirical findings such as establishing the phenomenon of illusory conjunctions and discovering basic features that may constitute the building blocks of object perception. It has stimulated a wealth of experiments that have investigated issues of feature and object perception. It has highlighted the gap between the initial representation of individual features and the eventual perceptual awareness of wholistic objects and thus helped focus attention on the processes that may relate these two representations.
However, in spite of these accomplishments, the major claims of the theory are not supported by the existing evidence and may further be clarified by future research. In this article I argue both on empirical and theoretical grounds that the preattentive-attentive dichotomy cannot be appropriately applied to feature perception and feature integration. The article suggests some directions that future studies can take to investigate further the effects of attention on these perceptual operations.
I. Further studies that use additional converging operations are required to substantiate the claim that illusory conjunctions manifest a pure perceptual phenomenon that is not contaminated by memorial factors.
2. Contrary to predictions of the feature integration thepry, some evidence suggests that feature integration can be performed preattentively.
3. Most of the experiments reviewed in this article suffer from methodological difficulties that leave the data open to alternative interpretations. Thus, the only support for the notion that attention facilitates feature integration comes from Experiment 3 of Prinzmetal et al.'s (1986) study.
